The Theory of Strategy

B. H. LIDDELL HART

B. H. LIDDELL HART

Source:WikiCommons

Before going forward let's be clear on what strategy is. As per Clausewitz, in his significant work ON WAR  defined it as the " the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War.". In other words strategy forms, the general outline or the plan of the war point out the course of action for different campaigns which compose the war and modulate each battle.

One defect of this definition is that it intrudes on the sphere of policy, or the higher conduct of the war, which must necessarily be the responsibility of the government and not of the military leaders it employs as its agents in the executive control of operations. Another defect is that it narrows the meaning of ‘strategy’ to the pure utilization of battle, thus conveying the idea that battle is the only means to the strategical end. It was an easy step for Clausewitz's less profound disciples to confuse the means with the end and to reach the conclusion that in war every other consideration should be subordinated to the aim of fighting a decisive battle.

The Military Maxims of Napoleon

Compiled by General Burnod

First published in 1827

1. The frontiers of nations are either large rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, deserts are the most difficult to surmount; mountains come next, and large rivers hold only the third rank.

2. A plan of the campaign should anticipate everything which the enemy can do, and contain within itself the means of thwarting him. Plans of the campaign may be infinitely modified according to the circumstances, the genius of the commander, the quality of the troops and the topography of the theater of war.

Elements of National Power

The four basic elements of national power are

• Diplomacy
• Economy
• Information
• Military

Type of Arms Trade

Licensing

The term 'Licensing' refers to the case where the production takes place on the basis of licensing agreement between 2 companies if 2 different countries whereas the term “Unlicensed” production boot out the original holder of technology as well as the cases where the right of production is inherited by another legal entity(in case of successor states of USSR).

Arms Aid: Factsheet

Arms Aid is one of the most common and most prevalent methods of arms transfer. Aid often comes in form of money for the foreign military to buy weapon & equipment from the donor country. This aid is given to the countries in an alliance( Mutual Defence Assistance Programme-NATO), recipient countries which have a strategic partnership with donor countries or on a humanitarian basis.

Arms Trade

Source: Wikipedia

The two ways of international arms transfer are:
➠Arms Trade
➠Arms Aid 
Because of the secret nature of many arms transaction, the difficulty arises in describing the boundaries of each of the above 2 categories.

Theories of Conflict

From the last 2 decades, there has been a tremendous growth towards approach on the study of conflict and conflict management.The exact boundary of this emerging field is difficult to ascertain reason being many scholars and writers have been distinguishing between sub-categories of this field. They are operating in different domains such as court and legal system, public policy, labor-management relations, inter-ethnic relations and international diplomacy and have deduced their ideas from the variety of sources such as law, psychology, management theories, group dynamics, peace research, decision theory, and sociology.

India's Research and Development (R&D)

Introduction

The research environment in India exhibits a substantial opportunity for MNCs across the globe due to the intellectual capacity present in the country.  Numerous Indian engineers and management personnel are working across the globe showcasing the highly trained manpower available at minimal cost. Thus resulting in several MNCs have shifted or in the process of shifting their research and development (R&D) base to India. These R&D bases are either focused on product development or to serve the local market or to benefit the parent organization by developing a new innovative generation of products faster to the market across the world.

Market Size

• India’s Engineering R&D (ER&D) Globalization and Services market reached US$ 22.3 billion in 2016 and is set to rise to US$ 38 billion by 2020.(1)
• India accounted for 40 percent (US$ 13.4 billion) of the total US$ 34 billion of globalized engineering and R&D in 2016. (2)
• India has a total of 25 innovation centers in the country and has been ranked as the top innovation destination in Asia and second in the world for new innovation centers.(3)The country accounts for 27 percent of Asia’s new innovation centers.
• India has moved up to the 60th position in the 10th edition of Global Innovation Index (GII) in 2017 and will likely get into the list of the top 25 nations in the next 10 years.(4)
• India ranks second amongst the countries with the highest increase in contribution to high-quality scientific research. (5)
• India-based R&D services companies, which account for almost 22 percent of the global addressed market, grew much faster at 12.67 percent.
• The market for Engineering R&D (ER&D) companies in India is mainly structured across pure play PES companies such as Cyient, QuEST, eInfochips and the larger IT companies with a PES play such as Wipro, TCS, HCL. India's ER&D services market is expected to reach US$ 15-17 billion by 2020 and North America continues to be the largest market contributing to 55 percent of revenues.

Recent Investments and developments

• Intel India plans to invest Rs 1,100 crore (US$ 170.59 million) to expand its research and development center in Bengaluru, which would be the largest such center outside the US. 
• Tata Motors has tied up with Microsoft for using its connected vehicle technology along with artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities to improve the in-car connected experience. 
• Robert Bosch Engineering and Business Solutions (RBEI) has inaugurated its new reliability testing laboratory in Naganathapura in Bengaluru, build for US$ 3.5 million, and capable of testing Electronic Component Units (ECU) used in automobiles, aircraft, home appliances, and similar other systems. 

Government Initiatives
Some of the major initiatives taken by the Government of India to promote R&D sector are: 

• The Government of India aims to develop India into a global innovation hub by 2020 on the back of effective government measures taken to provide an enabling environment for growing research and development in India, says Mr. Y. S. Chowdary, Minister of State for Science and Technology & Earth Sciences, Government of India. 
• India and Israel have agreed to enhance the bilateral cooperation in science and technology in the next two years by providing US$ 1 million from each side to support new research and development (R&D) projects in the areas of big data analytics in healthcare and cybersecurity.

Numbers

(Rs. Crores)

NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SECTOR	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16*	2016-17*
Central Sector	34021.44	37894.46	38879.89	43094.9	46033.97	49173.49
State Sector	5137.56	5282.86	5951.15	6327.32	6982.83	7706.25
Private Sector	23295.71	27096.51	30514.8	32538.39	37835.64	43995.28
Higher Education Sector	3506.62	3708.96	4010.05	3365.49	3664.01	3989.01
Total	65961.33	73982.79	79355.89	85326.10	94516.45	104864.03

Source:(6)

(Rs. Crores)

NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON R&D IN RELATION TO GDP
Year		R&D Expenditure GDP at current prices		GDP at at current prices	R&D as %
Series 2011-12
2011-12	65961.33		8736329			0.76
2012-13	73982.79		9944013			0.74
2013-14	79355.89		11233522			0.71
2014-15	85326.10		12445128			0.69

Future Opportunities
Now with the government's support, the Research and Development sector in India is witnessing rich growth in the area.According to a study by management consulting firm Zinnov, engineering R&D market in India is estimated to grow at a CAGR of 14 percent to reach US$ 42 billion by 2020.

India is also expected to witness strong growth in its agriculture and pharmaceutical sectors as the government is investing large sums to set up dedicated research centers for R&D in these sectors. The Indian IT industry is also expected to add to the development of the R&D sector.(7)

Also in 2018 Budget special emphasis was given to invest in research, training, and skilling in robotics, artificial intelligence, digital manufacturing, big data analysis, quantum communication and internet of things etc.

Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine: Pre-Gulf War Era (1990-91)

Immediate Pre-Gulf War Era (1990-91)

This period marked the

• end of communism, 
• the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, 
• the dissolution of the Soviet Republic,
• the rise of Yeltsin, and 
• formation of the Russian Federation. 

Gorbachev announced unilateral force reductions in Europe in 1989. The Soviet military began a move toward professionalism versus conscription. Force development began to focus on qualitative factors rather than quantitative ones. The political factions reassessed the military threat from the West after force reductions and declared them less threatening. The Soviets doctrinal evolution plate was overflowing.

The central theme of doctrine evolution during this period was how to make "defensive doctrine" and "reasonable sufficiency" work after military restructuring. According to Lester Grau of the Foreign Military Studies Office, many indicators show the declaration of a defensive doctrine was 

"a purely political decision made for economic and political purposes and imposed on the military with little regard for the military logic of that doctrine." 

He points out that Soviet professional books and journal articles after the new doctrine declaration continued to reflect the Soviet military's conservative approach to operational art. Suddenly, the Soviets found themselves on a trip down the Yellow Brick Road, where perceptions and reality would come into sharp conflict.

The Soviet's view of the future battlefield emphasized nonlinearity. Their fielding systems optimized for deep battle peaked just before Gorbachev became General Secretary. New U.S. and NATO systems were clearly a generation ahead of those of the Soviets. The role of precision-guided munitions and electronic warfare had added a great combat additive to NATO forces. The Soviets were clearly behind; however, they did not intend simply to mirror image NATO's reliance on technology as a force multiplier. Soviet military professionals asserted they,

"will not follow in the wake of the probable enemy and copy his weapons and employment concepts  rather it intends to seek asymmetrical solutions, combining high combat effectiveness with economic efficiency." 

The Soviet forces "are to become equipped with the latest in science and technology and become increasingly more flexible, cohesive, and mobile." 

The revamped force structure was compact and ready, and easily expandable by an enhanced mobilization base. Finally, the restructured force relied on "fully automated command, control, communications infrastructure to facilitate mission execution. The Soviets hoped the synergy produced by these force structure factors would amount to an order of magnitude increase in combat effectiveness.

The Soviet's vision of the future battlefield was of a high intensity, dynamic, high tempo, air-land operation extending over vast land area and space. It orchestrated positional elements, preplanned fires, maneuverable fire elements, counterattack forces, and counterstrike forces. Maneuver defense using security zones and covering forces provided operational and tactical depth to the defense. Maneuver and counter-maneuver forces ensured the defense was viable and created conditions favorable to a counteroffensive. Tempo allowed the Soviets to use tactical units to counterattack into the operational depth of the enemy during operational/strategic counteroffensives.

An interesting characteristic of this doctrine is common to all Soviet military doctrine. The defense creates a favorable condition to culminate in an offensive. In this regard, the forces allotted to the defense were secondary to that of the counteroffensive and operational reserves exploited the counteroffensive. More than just blunting an attack, the defense became the means to seize the initiative from the aggressor. It also created the conditions that would ultimately lead to defeating the enemy. Key to seizing initiative is counterstrike and preemption. Although this period became one of how to apply "defensive doctrine," it is interesting that maintaining offensive capability was the essence of this defensive doctrine. The forces necessary to carry out this doctrine become very similar to those contained in the Brezhnev military doctrine. The primary difference was a smaller, faster, more concentrated force structure. One can, therefore, view the ideas of "strategic defensive" and counteroffensive as the same doctrinal concept.

May 9, 2016, photo, Russian soldiers march during the Victory Day military
 the parade marking 71 years after the victory in WWII in Red Square in Moscow, Russia

Throughout its evolution, Russian military doctrine took on certain primary characteristics. It took many forms and descriptions. But in looking at the doctrine closely, we see a persistent and recurrent theme involving offensive action. One can build a stereotype of the general characteristics of this doctrine. As the air phase of the Gulf War began in January 1991, this is the doctrinal template the Russians applied. It was the comparative paradigm they applied to measure Western military performance against their forty-year-old ideas about the nature of future war. It was this stereotypical doctrinal idea they used to "click their heels together" to carry their offensive force structure wherever they wished their military strategy to go.

Soviet Military Doctrine : Under Gorbachev

Gorbachev's Era (1983-89)
This era saw perhaps the most sweeping changes in Soviet military doctrine. In the early part of this period, the doctrine changed very little from what it had been under Brezhnev. In the mid-1980s, Gorbachev's perestroika (restructuring) markedly accelerated changes in military doctrine. An emphasis on the strategic defense, rather than preemptive offensive conventional strikes, marked the doctrine emerging from this period.
Many factors drove changes to this "defensive" military doctrine. That change in the doctrine was inevitable in the comments of then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, regarding the connection between domestic and foreign events:

"The achievements of our foreign policy would be much more impressive if we could assure greater internal stability. The numerous misfortunes that have befallen our country recently, the critical situation in the economy, the state of ethnic relations and natural calamities are reducing the chances of success in our foreign policy. The policy of reform thanks to which our country has restored its good name is undoubtedly giving rise in the world to a feeling of compassion and a desire and readiness to help us. But it should be frankly said that if our domestic troubles are multiplied by conservatism and ill will, intolerance and selfishness and clinging to dogmatic principles of the past, it will be more and more difficult for us to uphold the cause of peace, reduce tensions, fight for broader and irreversible disarmament, and integrate our country into the world system. That is why our diplomats are not living with their heads in the clouds. Their thoughts are turned to the harsh realities of our domestic life."

Military planners and politicians firmly believed that escalation to a nuclear war would destroy the Soviet state. They saw that their previous preemptive doctrine created a deadly paradox. Rapid conventional success against NATO on any axis might accelerate NATOs decision to nuclear first use exactly what preemption was trying to preclude. Thus, the previous Soviet strategic concept contained the seeds of its own destruction. Secondly, in the 1970s and early 1980s, NATO leaders perceived the Soviet buildup as threatening and destabilizing. As such, NATO responded with deliberate political and military measures. The resultant NATO buildup in technologically superior forces, and the political will for rapid reinforcement, decreased the Soviets likelihood to win a conventional war in the initial period. Additionally, the NATO buildup forced the Soviets to ensure their industry and technology kept up with the NATO response. The result was a draining military competition with the civilian economy that economically and technologically drained the Soviets. The maintenance of a military capability to carry out a preemptive doctrine was a burden the Soviet economy could not endure. Third, the economic drain exerted indirect costs. The Soviets became politically and economically isolated from the most advanced countries of the world that they needed to enhance technology and hard cash transfers. The direct costs imposed by the military demands for the workforce, material, and technology exacerbated the Soviets decline on the world's stage. Finally, the Soviet Union's internal politics were in turmoil during this period. The impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology virtually disappeared from the formation of military doctrine. The Soviets put their view of others on a "back burner" as they concentrated on their view of themselves.

In 1985, the Soviet political leadership redefined the military doctrine to support the pressing political, economic, and societal concerns. Under the new doctrine, the conduct of the defensive operation was a precursor to the preparation of strong conventional counterstrikes, followed by a concentrated counteroffensive. The military strategists presented the defensive phase as a temporary measure to buy time in the initial period of a conflict. The Soviets would use this time to mobilize, reinforce and move rear echelons forward for the counteroffensive. The official presentation of the new doctrine focused almost exclusively on the initial period of the defense, with little said about the counterstrike and counteroffensive periods. The doctrine shifted away from the aggressive nature of the Brezhnev years. In its place was a so-called "defensive doctrine," with the weapons associated with it being of "reasonable sufficiency." The new doctrine led to the Soviet military developing plans to conduct a more prolonged initial defense.

Within the new military doctrine; however, was the provision to switch, perhaps suddenly, from the general strategic defensive to a counteroffensive. The transition to the counteroffensive marked the end of the initial period of war. This required that the strategic defensive must make up an "intentional positional defense by Soviet armies and fronts to exhaust and halt the maneuver component of an attacker's strike force." To achieve a sufficient correlation of force for the counteroffensive to succeed, the Soviets needed more forces beyond those prescribed in the new defensive doctrine. This put a premium on the mobilization of strategic reserves and forward movement of follow-on echelons. Once forces from the strategic reserve moved forward, they would exploit the success achieved by the early front counterstrikes. Without fire superiority, the surprise, maneuver, and decisiveness of the counterstrike were impossible. Enemy deep fire systems and reconnaissance had to be destroyed, mostly by air, so that the maneuver forces had freedom of action.

The new doctrine, therefore, emphasized the importance of the initial period of war. The new doctrine mandated answering a NATO attack with a "devastating rebuff." The doctrine was unclear whether this "rebuff" was limited to a counteroffensive only, or might be expanded to a full-scale strategic offensive operation. In 1987, Defense Minister Yazov called for a decisive offensive to follow a counteroffensive. By late 1989, when the new military doctrine emerged, he said, "Until recently, we planned to repel aggressions with defensive and offensive operations. Now, however, we are planning defensive operations as the basic form of our combat action."

Central to this new "defensive doctrine," however was a concept of military art prevalent throughout all Soviet military doctrine evolution. Victory only came by defeating the enemy, and the offense was the mode of operation that defeated the enemy. The Soviet military said little publicly on issues related to the debate over the counteroffensive. Hines and Mahoney feel the military's reticence may have stemmed from the atmosphere of uncertainty and fluidity characterizing Soviet military affairs after the December 1988 announcement of unilateral force reductions. Michael M. Boll asserts that the "Warsaw Pact continued to exercise with simulated nuclear weapons in sharp contrast to the doctrines reorientation emphasizing defensive preparation. He argues it is likely that the Soviets announced defensive position was more "in the realm of intent  than to an immediate reform." The General Staff was probably trying to forego any further policy surprises and were pursuing a course of flexibility and prudence. Officially, they embraced the defensive; but, in their minds, they continued an offensive spirit.

Soviet Military Doctrine : Under Brezhnev

Brezhnev's Era (1964-82)
Only minor changes in thought regarding the nature of future war occurred under Brezhnev. Given the massive nuclear capabilities on both sides, military doctrine during this era reflected a belief that conflict would eventually involve large-scale exchanges of nuclear weapons. Conventional options and the concept of strategic operations within the Western TVD opposite NATO became dominant.
Central to this doctrine was the belief that a Warsaw Pact strategic conventional offensive could preemptively deny NATO any incentive to initiate a nuclear war. Success depended on

1. attaining early air superiority 
2. timely and discrete cooperation among the Warsaw Pact allies and 
3. strategic surprise.

The primary doctrinal change was the reemergence of conventional operations in a major war. The new doctrine postulated an initial conventional phase at the start of a war. If a balance of forces existing between both sides, the initial conventional phase might last quite a long time. Given that the enemy might strike with nuclear weapons first, the initial conventional phase took on very specific characteristics. Time was the "coin of the realm." Friendly forces needed to destroy the enemy's advance defense lines and the enemy's tactical nuclear weapons quickly. The initial conventional strikes had to seize as many enemies critical targets as possible to disrupt the enemy's defensive position.

As in the Khrushchev era, doctrine continued to emphasize surprise, especially its strategic value. The most dangerous, and likely scenario to start a war, was a surprise attack by the enemy. Given scenarios based on speed and surprise, it is logical that the doctrine insisted on the primacy of the offense. An external international effect influencing doctrine was the Soviet Unions achieving nuclear parity with the United States. For the first time, the Soviets possessed a credible nuclear offensive capability to deter nuclear escalation. In the international political arena, Soviet tensions eased with other countries. As the Soviet economy began to expand domestically, they could field the forces necessary to carry out the military doctrine they espoused.

Perhaps two of the most important factors influencing military doctrine was the influence of foreign military doctrines and changes in the nature of the Soviet political system. In 1961, the United States moved away from an exclusive nuclear response (massive retaliation), to selective nuclear options (flexible response). Thus, conventional operations became more interesting to Soviet planners. The historical significance of the USSR being involved in two major world wars on the continent continued to influence military doctrines reliance on large conventional forces. More importantly, the internal political apparatus under Brezhnev became more conservative, pluralist, and bureaucratic in decision-making. The military, KGB, and heavy and light industry all received representation on the Politburo. As a result, significant real appropriations increased for each of these sectors each year. In this context, a change in military doctrine to one emphasizing a conventional option enhanced the role of the ground forces and again made them "a more integral and legitimate actor in the decision-making process."

Soviet Military Doctrine : Under Khrushchev

Khrushchev's Era (1954-64)
Freed from the stupefying control of Stalin, military doctrine changed significantly under Khrushchev. The major doctrinal trend was to adopt the new nuclear weapons, missile technology, and means of conflict to the old views and concepts of future war. Khrushchev dropped the idea of the inevitability of war between socialism and capitalism. He did not see war as a protracted affair between massed conventional ground forces in Europe. 

Instead, the war would result from the inevitable escalation of a small conventional war into a nuclear one. Short, intense, massive exchange of nuclear weapons delivered by rockets and aircraft dominated this view of war. Because of this outlook, Khrushchev downgraded and partially demobilized ground forces and tactical air forces. Conventional options were rendered obsolescent, and the Strategic Rocket Forces emerged as preeminent receiving the lions share of the Soviet defense budget.

The new doctrine connoted that enemy forces would be dealt a nuclear strike to weaken them, and then they would be attacked by tanks and mechanized forces at a high tempo. Nuclear weapons became the means of establishing favorable conditions for the rapid advance of the ground forces. With the defense weakened, the ground forces would break through, avoid a frontal assault on strong points, and carry out flexible maneuvers to deal decisive blows to the enemy's flanks and rear.

This view of the future battlefield led to the offense becoming the dominant form of battle to the Soviets. Such a doctrine accordingly emphasized the role of surprise. War was not likely to last long so the initial period would be the most important. Both sides would try to achieve the initiative at the start. This doctrine created a different set of contributions for airpower. Instead of being viewed as long-range artillery in support of the ground forces, it became a prime instrument to deliver the nuclear blows. Additionally, it was the force of choice preventing an enemy from delivering his nuclear response to the Soviet offense.

Other factors influenced doctrine evolution. The U. S. strategic nuclear superiority and cold war challenge led to the Soviet policy of preemption. On the domestic side, populist reforms and advances in technology emphasized modernity and international competition, especially with the United States. By not stressing the inevitability of idealistic war, the Marxist-Leninist dialectic had less impact on the military doctrine than under Stalin. The experience of World War II continued in its influence on doctrine; however, Soviets began to analyze the failures in the 1941-42 operations to prevent their recurrence.